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EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF MONETARY POLICY 
NORMALISATION FOR IRISH MORTGAGE ARREARS1,2 
Mike Fahy, Kieran McQuinn, Conor O’Toole, Rachel Slaymaker* 
ABSTRACT 
The current level of the monetary policy rate in the Eurozone is low both by 
international and historical standards and will likely rise over the coming years. In 
this Article we consider what the impact of a rise in ECB policy rates would mean 
for the Irish mortgage market. First, we examine the structure of the Irish mortgage 
market in terms of interest rate contract types and explore the link between the 
mortgage rate and the policy rate. Second, we draw out the results of policy 
modelling linking arrears and interest rates using a model put forward in Slaymaker 
et al. (2019). We then use this model to provide some further scenarios exploring 
the impact of interest rate rises on the arrears rate for particular groups of Irish 
households. Our findings suggest a 25 basis point increase in the policy rate would 
lead to a 0.1 percentage point increase in new missed mortgage payments. While 
households are in a better economic position to withstand policy rate increases 
given the recovery in the labour market and in house prices, rate rises would lead 
to payments rising faster than long-term income growth. Younger, lower income 
households who are at an earlier stage in their mortgage contract are more at risk, 
as are households on tracker interest rates who have a contractual pass-through 
from the policy rate to the lending rate.  
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the Irish mortgage market has 
gone through a period of considerable upheaval. At the peak of the crisis, one-in-
five mortgage loans were in arrears as households were confronted with 
simultaneous shocks in the labour market and to house prices. High origination 
loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios, as well as an over-extension of credit to 
low income households meant few buffers were available to absorb the 
1 This research is funded under the Macroeconomy, Taxation and Banking Joint Research Programme between the 
Department of Finance and the ESRI. The views presented in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not 
represent the official views of either the Department of Finance or the Economic and Social Research Institute. Results 
presented in this paper are based on analysis of strictly controlled research microdata files provided by the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO). The CSO does not take any responsibility for the views expressed or the outputs generated from 
this research. Any remaining errors are our own. 
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macroeconomic downturn  which transpired after 2008 (McCarthy and McQuinn, 
2017; Lydon and McCann, 2017). 
 
As the domestic economy continued to deteriorate, real earnings fell and 
unemployment rose strongly. Few policy levers were available to offset the decline 
in the economy given the requirement to follow a pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
adjustment under the economic support programme with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB). One policy lever that did provide a countervailing force was the decline in 
the monetary policy rate which was part of a broader package of aggressive 
monetary policy actions by the ECB and other global Central Banks to offset the 
financial and sovereign debt crises (Gerlach, 2013).  
 
For a highly indebted economy like Ireland, reductions in the ECB policy rate are 
beneficial from a financial stability perspective if they reduce the debt repayment 
burden for borrowers. While not all mortgage holders in Ireland benefited from 
lower policy rates due to a breakdown in interest rate pass-through, certain 
cohorts such as tracker rate contract holders saw their repayments decline 
automatically. This helped provide a buffer to absorb some of the negative 
economic shocks. Byrne et al. (2017) find that monetary policy rate pass-through 
in Ireland led to a lower default rate amongst tracker borrowers than would 
otherwise be the case.   
 
Since 2013 the Irish economy has recovered, house prices have rebounded 
dramatically and unemployment has fallen to just under 6 per cent. The significant 
turnaround in economic fortunes has provided a supportive context for 
improvements in the mortgage market with the share of mortgage loans in arrears 
falling to just under 7 per cent in the first half of 2018 (Central Bank of Ireland, 
2018). An extensive programme of mortgage modification has also played a role in 
reducing the share of mortgages in arrears (McCann, 2017; Donnery et al., 2018).  
 
More recently, European economies have begun to recover, with inflation now 
increasing towards the ECB target of 2 per cent or below. With the gradual 
withdrawal of extraordinary monetary policy measures already underway, and the 
US Federal Reserve and Bank of England raising policy rates, it is likely the ECB will 
begin to gradually move the policy rate back up to a more ‘normalised’ level if 
economic conditions allow. Such a rise in rates would inevitably have a 
considerable impact on the repayment capacity of Irish borrowers and their ability 
to service debt obligations in the mortgage market.  
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To consider what the impact of a rise in ECB policy rates would mean for the Irish 
mortgage market, the aims of this Special Article are threefold. First, we consider 
the structure of the Irish mortgage market in terms of interest rate contract types 
and explore the link between the mortgage rate and the policy rate. Second, we 
draw out the results of policy modelling linking arrears and interest rates using a 
model put forward in Slaymaker et al. (2019). We use this model to provide some 
further scenarios exploring the impact of interest rate rises on whether or not Irish 
households would miss a mortgage payment due to financial distress if interest 
rates were to rise. Our indicator of missed mortgage payments is broader than the 
strict 90 days past due definition that is used by the Central Bank for reporting and 
monitoring purposes. Instead, it captures those households who miss any 
payments due to financial distress. The model documented in Slaymaker et al. 
(2019) links mortgage arrears to changes in the actual monthly repayment-to-net 
income level of the household. This provides a direct measurement of the effect of 
interest rate rises on the affordability of payments for each household. Finally, we 
discuss the implications for policy.  
 
A number of findings emerge. As outlined in Slaymaker et al. (2019), a 25 basis 
point increase in the monetary policy rate leads (within one year) to a 0.1 
percentage point increase in the flow of new missed mortgage payments based on 
2016 data. As noted above, the measurement of arrears is not the standard 90 days 
past due as measured by the official Basel definition, so the flow to new 90-day 
arrears would therefore be lower than that provided by our estimates. As the 
effects of interest rates are non-linear (through the standard non-linear, 
repayment amortisation schedule), a larger adjustment of 100 basis points (similar 
to the 2018 US Federal Reserve adjustment) in the policy rate raises the flow of 
households into arrears by 0.5 percentage points.  
 
Given that the Irish economy is growing at a significant rate at present, it is useful 
to explore whether a rise in household incomes would offset any of the increase in 
the policy rate. To address this issue, Slaymaker et al. (2019) raise all household 
incomes by the long-run average income growth rate in the economy adjusted for 
the higher policy rate using COSMO (Bergin et al., 2017), a structural model of the 
Irish economy. They find that the rise in income does not offset the increase in 
repayments due to higher interest rates. This is because mortgage repayments, 
owing to the non-linear combination of income and interest rates, rise at a faster 
pace than income levels. However, this does not take into account a lower 
unemployment rate which would arise in an improved economy and is a critical 
determinant of mortgage default.  
 
Finally, we use the model in Slaymaker et al. (2019) to explore the impact of a 50 
basis point rise in the policy rate on different groups of households namely: a) 
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those on tracker versus standard variable (SVR) rates; b) young versus older 
households; c) low versus higher income borrowers; and d) loans with a longer 
term remaining versus loans closer to maturity. We find that younger, lower 
income households who are at an earlier stage in their mortgage contract are more 
at risk. In addition, tracker borrowers, who have a contractual pass-through from 
the policy rate to the lending rate, will inevitably face larger increases in their 
repayments compared to standard variable rate borrowers.   
 
Understanding the likely path of ECB interest rates over the coming years is 
complicated as it is affected by a range of factors. Such factors include the outlook 
for the European economy, European inflation, and broader developments in 
Europe around the balance of Central Bank policymaking power. The negative 
effects of Brexit again may delay normalisation. However, for a highly indebted 
economy like Ireland with a vulnerable mortgage market, it is prudent to plan for 
eventual rate rises and ensure buffers are available to absorb these at a household 
and bank level.  
 
The rest of this Article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the structure of 
the Irish mortgage market and discusses the link between lending rates and the 
policy rate. Section 3 presents the main findings in Slaymaker et al. (2019). Section 
4 presents some additional scenarios and Section 5 draws out the implications for 
policy.  
2. STRUCTURE OF IRISH MORTGAGE MARKET AND INTEREST RATE RISK 
The degree to which policy rate increases are passed through to borrowers 
depends on two structural features of the mortgage market. First, the share of new 
loans and the outstanding stock that are on variable rate contracts determines the 
degree to which banks can pass through increases in their cost of funding to 
households. Second, pass-through from the policy rate to the lending rate which 
depends on a number of factors including the degree of competition, the cost of 
funds, credit risk, and the ability of households to refinance mortgages in the face 
of interest rate increases. In Section 2.1, we will document the first of these issues 
while discussing the second in Section 2.2. 
2.1 Interest rate types in the Irish mortgage market 
Loans in the Irish mortgage market are issued either on a fixed or variable rate 
basis, with the vast majority on the latter. There are two types of variable rate 
loans: those that track the ECB base rate at an agreed margin, typically called 
‘trackers’, and those that do not. In the case of the latter, the lender offers no 
specific link to an underlying market or wholesale rate and can choose to increase 
or decrease the rate at its discretion. In this paper, when we refer to variable rate 
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mortgages, we mean excluding trackers. The most common variable rate product 
is the Standard Variable Rate or ‘SVR’. 
 
Figure 1 panel A outlines the share of outstanding mortgage loan balances3  on 
standard variable rate, tracker rate, and fixed rate loans. It can be seen that in 
Ireland the market is currently dominated by variable rate contracts. As of Q2 2018, 
by outstanding loan value (loan balances), 37 per cent of the balance of mortgage 
loans outstanding in Ireland have standard variable rate contracts, a further equal 
share of 37 per cent of the balance have tracker interest rates. A further 2.5 per 
cent of the balance have fixed rate loans of less than one-year fixation which is in 
essence a variable rate loan. In terms of longer-term fixed rates, 12 per cent of 
mortgage balances had a one- to three-year fixed rate, a further 9.5 per cent of 
balances had a three- to five-year fixed rate while a total of 2.5 per cent had a fixed 
rate greater than five years. This indicates that a total of 26 per cent of Irish 
mortgage balances have some type of rate fixation leaving approximately 74 per 
cent, or three-quarters of the balance of loans, at risk of rate changes if the ECB 
adjusts its policy rate. In terms of the number of loans, the Central Bank of Ireland 
Credit Market Report 2018, indicates that as of Q2 2018, 21 per cent of fixed rate 
contracts were over one year maturity.4   
 
This reliance on variable rate contracts leaves the holders of these mortgages very 
exposed to increases in rates in the future. Indeed, the short-term nature of the 
fixed rate loans in the Irish market is also a cause for structural concern as, 
compared to markets such as the US or Denmark where mortgage fixation periods 
often last 30 years, all the fixed rate products in Ireland are short-term in duration. 
The longest fixed-term rate on the market in Ireland currently is ten years in 
duration.5 In comparison to other European countries, Ireland’s share of variable 
rate origination is higher than the median (See Figure 1, panel C). In 2013, 
mortgage markets such as France and Belgium had fewer than 10 per cent of loans 
on variable contracts as compared to 85 per cent of loans in Ireland.  
 
                                                          
 
3  This refers to the proportion of the value of outstanding loans by interest rate type, not the proportion of the number 
of loans.  
4  https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/household-credit-market-report/household-credit-
market-report-2018.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
5  Sibley, E. (2018) ‘The Irish Mortgage Market – 2018 and beyond’, Remarks delivered to the Institute of Banking 
Breakfast briefing ‘The Irish Mortgage Market – past, present and future’. 
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FIGURE 1 OVERVIEW OF INTEREST RATE TYPES IN IRELAND AND EUROPEAN COMPARISON 
A. Share of Outstanding PDH Mortgage Loans by Interest Rate Type – Ireland 
 
 
B. Share of New Mortgage Lending by Interest Rate Type – Ireland 
 
 
C. Share of Variable Rate Loans Originated in 2013 – EU Comparison 
 
 
Sources:  A: Central Bank of Ireland, Private Household Credit Statistics Table A.18.1. 
B: Central Bank of Ireland, Retail Interest Rates Table B3.1.  
C: European Systemic Risk Board, Report on Residential Real Estate and Financial Stability in the EU, 2016. 
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The high share of interest rates on variable contracts heightens the risk associated 
with the mortgage market’s potential exposure to changes in the banks’ cost of 
funding through the policy rate. The difference in interest rate type has important 
implications from a modelling perspective when attempting to estimate the 
impacts of interest rate changes on households’ repayment capacity.  
 
For the Irish mortgage market, borrowers holding tracker rate contracts are a 
substantial source of vulnerability. These loans were originated at the height of the 
credit boom and the underlying loan sizes are larger than for other contracts. Kelly 
et al. (2015) show that, while tracker loans are larger, their median repayments 
have been lower than other contract types as they have benefited considerably 
from the low interest rate environment and the contractual margin between the 
policy rate and their mortgage rate. Byrne et al. (2017) further document that 
tracker borrowers have experienced much lower default rates as a result of the 
lower ECB policy rate. Naturally, as tracker borrowers have benefited from a fall in 
the policy rate, these loans will be immediately impacted when the policy rate 
begins to move.  
2.2 Interest rates and the link to monetary policy 
It has been well documented that mortgage interest rates in Ireland are high by 
European standards.6 Figure 2 plots the average interest rate in Ireland on 
outstanding mortgage loans relative to other European countries. From 2000 
onwards, Irish rates, mainly due to increased competition in the domestic market, 
were below the median in other countries; since 2014, Irish mortgage interest rates 
are now the highest of the group of countries for which data are available.  
 
 
                                                          
 
6  See ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2018; Central Bank of Ireland Influences on Standard Variable Rate 
Pricing in Ireland, 2016.  
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FIGURE 2 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS – EUROPEAN 
COMPARISON 
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data differ 
between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the new business 
SVR is only for new drawdowns. 
 
Understanding the determinants of interest rates in Ireland is particularly 
important when considering the extent to which rates will be passed through to 
borrowers in the event of a monetary policy rate rise. The process of rate ‘pass-
through’ is an important structural feature of any mortgage market and is a critical 
channel in the functioning of monetary policy (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004; 
Karagiannis, 2010).  
 
The pass-through inevitably depends on the share of variable and fixed rate 
contracts in the market as discussed above. Having determined in Section 2.1 that 
Ireland is a market with predominantly variable rates, this transmission channel of 
monetary policy is particularly important. However, rate pass-through also 
depends on a multitude of other factors. A number of studies (including Goggin et 
al., 2012 and McQuinn and Morley, 2015) conclude that the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, i.e. the extent to which European policy rates influence 
domestic rates, has, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, broken down in the 
case of the Irish mortgage market. The reasons for this are primarily concerned 
with the many legacy issues arising in the Irish banking sector after the 2007/2008 
crash. Internationally, there is evidence of a weaker pass-through following the 
crisis. Illes et al. (2015) explore why bank lending rates did not fall as much as the 
decline in policy rates would have suggested following the crisis. They find this was 
due to the fact that the policy rate did not accurately reflect the cost of bank 
liabilities.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
%
Interquartile Range (P25-P75) Min Max Median Ireland
 9 
 
Figure 3 plots the Irish SVR, tracker rate and the ECB policy rate over time. As noted 
in Goggin et al. (2012), mortgage lenders in the Irish market tend to use the three-
month Euribor as a benchmark for adjusting the pricing of variable rate mortgages. 
Euribor in general follows the ECB MRO (Main Refinancing Operations rate), as 
presented in Figure 3. Up to 2010, it is clear that Irish lenders tended to track the 
policy rate both for increases and decreases in the Euribor rate. However, since 
2011, domestic policy rates have not fallen by as much as the decline in the Euribor 
would suggest. Goggin et al. (2012) contend that one reason for the divergence is 
that some Irish lenders are charging higher variable rates to compensate for the 
losses being made on their tracker loans given the relatively higher funding costs 
associated with these products. The interest rate on tracker loans has fallen in line 
with their contractual mark-up to the ECB base rate. Other structural factors such 
as market competition can also impact the degree of pass-through of the policy 
rate to mortgage rates. It is clear that competition in the Irish market declined in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis as a number of institutions left the Irish 
market.7 Other factors impacting the degree of pass-through can include the banks’ 
cost of funds and the credit risk of borrowers. Indeed, Illes et al. (2015) find the 
weighted cost of liabilities to be a good driver of bank lending margins since the 
crisis. The banks’ cost of funds is determined by their liability structure, for example 
the ability of the banks to access funding internationally as well as domestically 
through bonds, share issuance, interbank lending, and savings products 
(household and corporate). More recently, Sibley (2018) has focused on the low 
rate of repossessions in the Irish market and the inability of banks to repossess 
collateral which, in turn, undermines the link between lending and security. Sibley 
(2018) also notes that capital requirements and risk weighting, in an economy with 
high levels of legacy debts, and the subsequent provisions that must be held 
against mortgages, may also raise the cost of lending in Ireland.8  
 
 
                                                          
 
7  See Influences on Standard Variable Rate Pricing in Ireland – Central Bank of Ireland report.  
8  Ibid. and Sibley, E. (2018). ‘The Irish Mortgage Market – 2018 and beyond’. Remarks delivered to the Institute of 
Banking Breakfast briefing ‘The Irish Mortgage Market – past, present and future’.  
 10 
FIGURE 3 STANDARD VARIABLE RATE, TRACKER RATE AND ECB MRO RATE 
 
 
Source: Authors calculation using Central Bank of Ireland, Byrne et al. (2017), and ECB data.   
 
In more recent years, increased competition has occurred in the domestic market 
and a marginal decline in the standard variable rate can be seen. Of critical 
importance from our perspective is how increases in the policy rate would be 
passed through to borrowers on the ground and in turn how this would impact 
mortgage arrears. For tracker borrowers it is clear, these would face a contractual 
100 per cent pass-through. For standard variable rate holders, the degree of pass-
through is less clear. Goggin et al. (2012) found that the pass-through parameter 
to the standard variable rate in the period before the financial crisis was 0.6 per 
cent for every 1 per cent change in the policy rate. If this relationship was to 
continue, then any increase in the policy rate would represent a considerable rate 
increase for variable rate contracts.  
 
Taken together, the pass-through to Irish households on variable rate contracts 
(both tracker and standard variable) would certainly pose an additional risk in 
terms of their repayment capacity and inevitably lead to a heightened risk of 
arrears.   
3. POLICY RATE NORMALISATION AND ARREARS 
3.1 Sample, model and empirical approach 
In this section, we present a short overview of the methodology and analysis in 
Slaymaker et al. (2019) as context for understanding the impact of policy rate 
changes on mortgage arrears. The dataset used is the EU-SILC survey for Ireland 
which has been collected annually since 2003. The main aim of the survey is to 
collect information on poverty, household incomes and deprivation. However, 
critically for our purposes, the Irish SILC survey has a variable which captures the 
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level of the monthly mortgage payment. It also has information on the current loan 
balance outstanding, an estimate of the current house price, originating mortgage 
conditions (term and balance), current interest rate type and importantly whether 
or not the household missed a mortgage repayment due to financial difficulties. 
The interest rate on a loan-by-loan basis can be solved from an amortisation 
formula given the originating balance, term and current payment. The data do not 
capture mortgage equity releases or top-ups so these estimates may 
underestimate the overall effects of rate rises for households with these products. 
SILC is an annual survey so all variables are measured in annual terms.  
 
The dataset also has a four-year rotating panel with each household remaining in 
the sample for a maximum of four years. This provides a rich source of within-
household variation in key variables over time. For brevity, we do not go into detail 
in this Article on the specifics of the sample. However, these can be found in Fahy 
et al. (2018) and Slaymaker et al. (2019). 
 
The combination of current information on income and mortgage payments as well 
as an arrears flag is relatively unique and is not available in many loan-level 
datasets available in Ireland, Europe and the US which are used for official stress 
testing purposes. Having this information allows us to calculate a current debt 
service ratio as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐷𝑆𝑅) =  (
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) 
 
This current debt service ratio can then be included as a covariate explaining 
arrears. A noteworthy distinction between SILC and the official Central Bank 
measure of mortgage arrears is important at this juncture. In SILC, mortgage 
arrears are measured using responses to the following question:  
In the last 12 months, did it happen that the household was unable to 
make a mortgage repayment for the main dwelling on time, due to 
financial difficulties? 
 
The Central Bank mortgage arrears data use a more standard Basel definition of 
mortgage arrears which is 90 days past due. Our measure is therefore a looser 
indicator and could capture households who are early in the arrears process, even 
those who are only a very small number of days past due.  
 
The model and empirical findings 
To test the impact of the debt service ratio on arrears, Slaymaker et al. (2019) use 
a standard discrete time logit survival model to estimate the probability of 
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mortgage arrears as a function of the change in the debt service ratio (DSR) to 
capture payment or income shocks, the lagged level of the DSR to capture 
indebtedness and repayment capacity, the level of the current loan-to-value (CLTV) 
ratio, the log of lagged income, employment status, loan vintage, regional 
macroeconomic controls and other household controls.   
Pr(𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(∆𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡−1,𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑍𝑟𝑡−1, 𝑡) 
 
Table 1 shows the importance of both the lagged level of the DSR capturing 
repayment capacity and the change in the DSR capturing payment and income 
changes as determinants of households falling into mortgage arrears. It also 
demonstrates that the parameters on these two key determinants of mortgage 
arrears have changed over time. We therefore focus on the post-crisis period 2010-
2016 only in the following scenario analysis to ensure that the parameters provide 
the most accurate predictions.  
TABLE 1  EMPIRICAL MODEL ESTIMATES 
 Full Sample Post-Crisis Only 
L.DSR 
0.100*** 
(0.0387) 
0.130** 
(0.0606) 
ΔDSR 
0.122*** 
(0.0475) 
0.239*** 
(0.0700) 
CLTV Y Y 
Employment Status Y Y 
Income Y Y 
Household Characteristics Y Y 
Regional Macro Controls Y Y 
Loan Vintage Y Y 
Observations 4,239 2,439 
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
Notes:  Household characteristics include; age, marital status, education, household composition and NUTS3 region. Full sample refers 
to 2004-2016, while post-crisis sample refers to 2010-2016.  
3.2 Scenario analysis 
In Slaymaker et al. (2019) we use the model discussed in the previous section to 
first calculate a baseline predicted probability of falling into arrears for each 
borrower. We then conduct an interest rate shock scenario by allowing for a 
different pass-through relationship according to the interest rate type for each 
household. A new instalment is then calculated using an amortisation formula. The 
payment for each scenario is then a function of the shocked interest rate, the 
borrower’s mortgage term, and the original loan amount. Once the new payment 
has been calculated, we then recalculate the debt service ratio which is fed into 
the model to calculate a new predicted probability of falling into arrears for each 
household. We then take the mean predicted probability of falling into arrears 
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across all households in each year and compare to the mean baseline figure to 
quantify the increase in the average predicted probability of falling into arrears.  
 
Given the uncertainty over the likely magnitude of future policy rate rises, we 
examine the impact of a range of interest rate shocks from a small 25 to a larger 
100 basis point rise. In a speech to the ECB Forum on Central Banking in June 2018, 
Mario Draghi stated that the ECB ‘will remain patient in determining the timing of 
the first rate rise and will take a gradual approach to adjusting policy thereafter’. 
We therefore begin with a 25 basis point shock. As our model is annual and looks 
at the one-year impacts of an interest rate rise, it is plausible that we could see a 
number of smaller quarterly rises totalling a larger annual increase such as 50 or 
100 basis points. At the more severe end of the scale, the 2018 EBA banking stress 
test adverse scenario for the Irish long-term rate has an increase of 150 basis 
points; while McCann (2017) implements a 200 basis point shock on tracker loans 
in work using loan-level data. From the perspective of our static one-year model, 
we feel that increases of these magnitudes are not realistic within a calendar year 
and instead undertake three shocks 25, 50 and 100 basis points.  
 
Figure 4 plots the percentage point increase in the predicted probability of 
households falling into arrears under the interest rate shock scenarios ranging from 
25 to 100 basis points. In 2016, a 25 basis point rise in the policy rate increases the 
flow of households falling into arrears by 0.1 percentage points, a 50 basis point 
rise leads to a 0.2 percentage point increase and a larger 100 basis point increase 
leads to just under a 0.5 percentage point increase in the flow of households into 
arrears.   
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FIGURE 4  DEVIATIONS FROM BASELINE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS UNDER INTEREST 
RATE SHOCK 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
 
Looking more closely at the mechanism through which this occurs, Figure 5 
illustrates how both monthly mortgage instalments and the debt service ratio 
increase in the event of an interest rate shock. A 50 basis point rise increases the 
mean payment by €100 per month and increases the DSR from 18.2 to 20.2 per 
cent.  
 
FIGURE 5  MONTHLY INSTALMENTS AND DEBT SERVICE RATIO UNDER INTEREST RATE SHOCK 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
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Given the recent rapid growth of the Irish economy, it is useful to explore whether 
an increase in household income could offset any of the increase in the arrears rate 
caused by an increase in the policy rate. To address this issue, Slaymaker et al. 
(2019) raise all household incomes by the long-run average growth rate in the 
economy, adjusted for the sensitivity of income to the higher policy rate using 
COSMO, the Core Structural Model of the Irish Economy (see Bergin et al., 2017). 
Figure 6 shows that the increase in the arrears rate is lower in the scenario with 
rising incomes as households have more buffers to withstand shocks.  However, 
rising incomes do not fully offset the rise in repayments due to increases in the 
policy rate. This is due to the non-linear nature of mortgage interest rate 
increases.9  This non-linearity is clearer in relation to tracker borrowers as 
illustrated in Figure 7 as these mortgage holders are more exposed to interest rate 
rises (through a greater pass-through of monetary policy).  
 
FIGURE 6  EFFECTS OF INTEREST RATE SHOCK ON MORTGAGE ARREARS UNDER RISING INCOMES 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
 
 
                                                          
 
9  See McQuinn and O’Reilly (2008) for more on the sensitivity of mortgage repayments due to the non-linear 
combination of income levels and interest rates. 
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FIGURE 7  INSTALMENT AND INCOME CHANGES UNDER INTEREST RATE SHOCK WITH RISING 
INCOMES 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
 
It should be noted that raising incomes for all households is only one channel 
through which risks would be mitigated. Often households that go into arrears 
would suffer catastrophic economic circumstances such as unemployment, which 
would lead to a much larger change in incomes than the standard annual rise 
posited here. Therefore in a growing economy, as employment increases, this 
would naturally increase income more than the standard factor increased here. As 
the unemployment rate has declined rapidly in Ireland in recent years, it is likely 
that further employment growth would help boost households’ ability to manage 
their mortgage payments and also lead to a smaller increase in the arrears rate 
than the simple exercise that we calculate here. More generally it is important to 
note that the most recent data we are able to use for this analysis are for 2016. As 
the economy has continued to improve into 2017 and 2018, accompanied by a 
falling arrears rate, it is likely that Irish households would in fact currently be better 
placed to absorb an interest rate rise. The results from this analysis can therefore 
be thought of as an upper bound of the likely true effect.   
 
Another channel which may help to moderate the increase in cases of arrears in a 
growing economy is rising house prices. One of the key features of the mortgage 
arrears crisis in Ireland was the extent to which short-term arrears cases 
transitioned into longer-term arrears due to many of these households being in 
negative equity, leaving them with little option but to remain in their property and 
fall deeper into arrears. As house prices have rebounded strongly in recent years, 
this naturally lowers the impact of negative equity on arrears and may lower the 
increase in arrears due to a policy rate rise.  
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In the scenario analysis presented here we deploy a range of interest rate increases 
from 25 to 100 basis points and test the impact on the likelihood of arrears over a 
one-year horizon. However, at this juncture, it is informative to reflect on what 
might the path of normalisation look like when the ECB does begin to raise the 
policy rate. In this context it is useful to consider how other Central Banks have 
historically changed rates as an indicator of the ECB’s path. Figure 8 presents the 
policy rates of selected global Central Banks including the ECB, US Federal Reserve 
and Bank of England. It can be seen that policy rates are at a historic low since the 
aggressive loosening following the financial crisis. The Federal Reserve and Bank of 
Canada have begun a policy of unwinding low rates on the back of stronger 
economic fundamentals and rising prices in these economies. Both the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of Canada undertook between 25 basis points and 75 basis 
points increases per annum from 2015-2018. If the ECB was to follow a similar 
policy it would mean the annual increases of between 25 and 50 basis points are 
more likely in the short run.  
 
FIGURE 8  POLICY RATES OF SELECTED GLOBAL CENTRAL BANKS 1990-2017  
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
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basis points shock is, arguably, the largest increase that would occur within a 
calendar year in a recovering European economy.  
 
Another point is noteworthy. The research works on a ceteris paribus basis holding 
all other factors constant. Households could, as an alternative, approach the bank 
for a temporary restructure to avoid a technical default and we do not take this 
into account. The household may also be able to delve into savings or other wealth 
to avoid payment and we cannot model this. 
4. ARE PARTICULAR GROUPS MORE EXPOSED? 
In this section we explore the impact of interest rate rises on the flow of 
households falling into arrears for particular groups of Irish households. To do this 
we calculate the predicted probabilities of falling into arrears for a 50 basis point 
shock by interest rate type, loan vintage, household age and disposable income.  
 
Figure 9 presents the predicted probability of new arrears flows for households 
with tracker and SVR mortgage rates (top two panels), and the corresponding 
percentage point difference between the initial baseline and 50 basis point interest 
rate shock scenario (bottom two panels). It must be noted that while the SILC 
survey gives a good representation of the mortgage market in general, it may 
under- or over-represent the sample for each specific rate type as the survey does 
not stratify by these criteria. These results must be interpreted with this caveat.  
 
In 2016 the baseline predicted rate of new arrears cases is similar for tracker and 
SVR households. However, the bottom two panels show that tracker borrowers, 
who have a contractual pass-through from the policy rate to the lending rate, will 
inevitably face higher repayments when interest rates rise. A 50 basis point rise 
leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the flows of new arrears for borrowers 
with tracker mortgages, compared to a 0.2 percentage point increase for those 
households with SVRs.  
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FIGURE 9  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS FLOWS UNDER 50BPS INTEREST RATE SHOCK BY 
RATE TYPE 
 
  
  
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC.  
 
Figure 10 examines the differing impacts of a policy rate rise by loan vintage, 
defined as years since mortgage origination. In 2016 younger vintage loans (less 
than ten years) actually have a lower probability of falling into arrears. However, 
these households are generally slightly more vulnerable to an increase in the policy 
rate compared to those with older vintage loans. Drawing any firm conclusions 
looking at the effects across loan vintage is complicated due to the number of loans 
issued under loose credit conditions in the early to mid-2000s. 
 
Another potentially vulnerable group of households are younger mortgage holders 
at the beginning of their income life cycle. In Figure 11 we show that not only do 
younger households (aged less than 35 years) have a higher likelihood of falling 
into arrears, they also face a larger increase in their probability of falling into 
arrears as a result of an interest rate shock. 
 
Finally, turning to income, Figure 12 illustrates that households outside the top 
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and they also face a larger increase in their probability of falling into arrears as a 
result of an interest rate shock. 
 
FIGURE 10  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS FLOWS UNDER 50BPS INTEREST RATE SHOCK BY 
LOAN VINTAGE  
 
   
  
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC.  
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FIGURE 11  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS FLOWS UNDER 50BPS INTEREST RATE SHOCK BY 
AGE 
  
  
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC.  
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FIGURE 12  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS FLOWS UNDER 50BPS INTEREST RATE SHOCK BY 
INCOME 
  
  
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC.  
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A number of policy implications arise from our research. The current level of the 
monetary policy rate in the Eurozone is low both by international and historical 
standards and will inevitably rise over the coming years. It is clear that interest rate 
normalisation poses a risk to many Irish households given high levels of 
indebtedness and the variable nature of interest rate contracts; an economy with 
a high share of variable rate contracts is particularly exposed to considerable 
interest rate risk (Leece, 2000). Our findings show that any increase in the policy 
rate would be somewhat offset by expected household income growth. The 
improved economic circumstances in Ireland in the past couple of years, in 
particular the fall in unemployment and recovery in house prices, does leave 
households in a better position to manage any increase in interest rates.  
 
The results point to specific households being more vulnerable to any interest rate 
rises. We find that tracker borrowers, who have a contractual pass-through from 
the policy rate to the lending rate, will inevitably face higher repayments. As the 
rates for these borrowers are still well below those for other contract types (fixed 
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or variable), it would require a steep rise in rates to make it beneficial for these 
households to switch rate type or to fix. Therefore until such time as tracker rates 
move towards fixed rates, fixation would not be optimal for these borrowers. For 
such households, if they have spare financial resources, steps to redeem part of 
the balance through increased payments would help to reduce indebtedness. 
However, this will not be possible for households without sufficient resources.   
 
We also find that younger, lower income households who are earlier into their 
mortgage contract are more at risk. Given the expected upward path of interest 
rates, encouraging such households to contract longer-term fixed interest rates 
would ensure these borrowers would be protected from future rate volatility. At 
present, only two banks offer fixed-rate mortgage products of ten years, and no 
provider offers fixed rates for the duration of the term (as would be standard in 
many other countries). From a market structure policy perspective, steps to move 
towards the introduction of longer-term fixed rate loans in the Irish market would 
be advantageous for two reasons.10  
 
From a household demand perspective, the option to fix for longer-term horizons 
would allow them to balance repayment risks with other factors such as income 
volatility. The use of longer-term fixed rate mortgage loans in the Irish market 
could also benefit households, by increasing transparency and stability for 
borrowers (CCPC, 2017). However, it is important to note that while in the short to 
medium term, rate fixation may be desirable for certain households given the 
expected upward path of interest rates, long-term fixed rates do remove flexibility 
and the ability of a borrower to potentially benefit from any fall in interest rates 
during an economic downturn. It has been well established that factors such as 
financial literacy, risk preference and interest rate expectations all feed into 
households’ choice of mortgage contract (Devine et al., mimeo). Information, 
increased awareness of the different loan options available in the market, and 
educational programmes that improve households’ understanding of complex 
choices would likely lead to a more optimal choice of interest rates.  
 
From the supply-side perspective of the financial sector, mortgage providers 
themselves would benefit from offering longer-term fixed rates if it reduced the 
likelihood of default and allowed financial institutions to better match the cost of 
liabilities with the return on assets.  
 
For some households who are exposed to interest rate increases, fixing may not be 
possible either due to financial circumstances or the fact that they continue to hold 
 
                                                          
 
10  Similar conclusions for the UK market are presented in the Miles (2004) report. The Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan 
introduced to the market recently provides 30-year fixed rate mortgages at a 2 per cent rate. 
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tracker rates which are lower than the current market-provided fixed rate options. 
In these circumstances, providing sufficient and timely information to households 
of the likely changes to payments when rates rise would be useful and allow them 
to plan accordingly. 
 
Finally, policies to prevent any future build-up of vulnerabilities through the excess 
supply of mortgage credit at the household level must remain an accepted, long-
term feature of the Irish market. In particular, the loan-to-income restriction 
introduced in January 2015 as part of the Central Bank’s macro-prudential 
mortgage market measures is a vital part of the financial stability architecture. The 
use of guidelines on interest rate stress testing by the banking sector on loan 
applications such as the 2 per cent stress test on short-term fixation and variable 
products in the Consumer Protection Code are important to limit any loosening of 
bank credit conditions outside the current macroprudential framework.   
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